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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MYRNA R. MARTIN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
RICHARD C. MOTT,
Defendant-Respondent,
and
STEVEN D. TAYLOR, JAMES WILFERT,
DAVID BURTON,INTERMOUNTAIN
HEALTH CARE, INC., a Utah
corporation, dba THE COTTONWOOD
HOSPITAL, and JOHN DOES I
through X,

Case No. 20509

Defendants.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Is the testimony of a medical doctor sufficient in a malpractice case against a podiatrist to raise an issue of fact
regarding violation of the applicable standard of care, where
the medical doctor admits that he does not know what the
standard of care ordinarily exercised by podiatrists is?

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES
There are no authorities which respondent believes to be
directly determinative of any of the issues presented in this
case.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Plaintiff has appealed from the district court's order
granting summary judgment in favor of defendant Mott based on
plaintiff's inability to produce competent expert testimony in
support of her claim against defendant Mott.
Course of Proceedings Below
On October 24, 1984, respondent moved for summary judgment
and for sanctions based on alleged bad faith of appellant
during discovery.

(R. 284-85.)

The district court granted the

motion for summary judgment on December 20, 1984 (R. 302), and
entered summary judgment in favor of respondent on January 9,
1985.

(R. 322-23.)

On January 29, 1985, the district court

certified the judgment as final for purposes of appeal, pursuant to Rule 54(b), U.R.C.P. (R. 337.)
filed February 21, 1985.

The notice of appeal was

(R. 338.)

Statement of Facts
This is an action alleging professional malpractice.
Defendant Mott is a podiatrist who treated plaintiff between
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May 12 and June 3, 1980.

Plaintiff claims Dr. Mott failed to

diagnose peripheral vascular disease.

(R. 2-4.)

The pretrial history of this case is a mockery.

Defendant

Mott was required to file five motions to compel or dismiss to
obtain basic information about plaintiff's claims and the identification of her expert witnesses.

On October 25, 1983, the

court heard Mott's third motion to compel and held a pretrial
conference.

The following was ordered:

1.
Plaintiff had ten days to answer defendant's
Interrogatories or the case would be dismissed.
2.
Plaintiff had fifteen days to designate expert
witnesses.
3.

Trial was set for January 9, 1984.

(R. 154.)

On November 21, 1983, an order of dismissal was

entered because plaintiff had not answered the interrogatories.

(R. 157.)

Plaintiff had also failed to designate

expert witnesses.
In December, 1983, plaintiff filed a motion for relief from
the order of dismissal.

(R. 162.)

In support of her motion,

plaintiff filed her affidavit stating she would respond to the
interrogatories and designate an expert witness within thirty
days.

(R. 159-61.)

In February, 1984, sixty days after plain-

tiff filed the affidavit, she still had not answered the interrogatories or designated expert witnesses.

At the hearing on

plaintiff's motion for relief the court ordered the following:
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1.
Plaintiff's motion for relief was continued to
March 1, 1984.
2.
Plaintiff was allowed until March 1, 1984, to
file an affidavit by an expert witness establishing a
prima facie case of negligence against each defendant,
or the motion for relief would be denied. (R. 168-69.)
On March 1, 1984, plaintiff filed the affidavit of Douglas
Lake, M.D.

(R. 172-74.)

The affidavit stated that Dr. Lake

had examined the records of each defendant and in his opinion
each was negligent in the care provided plaintiff.

Accord-

ingly, under the court's prior ruling, plaintiff's motion for
relief was granted and the order of dismissal vacated.
(R. 171.)
On March 6, 1984, defendant Mott filed a motion to dismiss
because plaintiff still had not answered the interrogatories
which the court ordered plaintiff to answer within ten (10)
days after October 25, 1983.

(R. 177-78.)

It was the plain-

tiff's failure to answer those same interrogatories on which
the order of dismissal was based in November, 1983.
8, 1984, plaintiff answered the interrogatories.

On March

(R. 180-84.)

However, in answer to Interrogatory No. 3, which asked whether
plaintiff intended to call Dr. Lake as an expert witness at
trial, plaintiff answered "Not decided."
On March 28, 1984, defendant's motion to dismiss was denied
and another pretrial conference was held.

At that time, plain-

tiff was ordered to designate all witnesses by April 10, 1984.
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The court expressly ordered that witnesses not so identified
would not testify at trial.

(R. 188.)

On April 10, 1984, plaintiff designated witnesses.

Douglas

Lake, William H. Fleming, Brian Burns, Douglas Flegal and
Irving Yale were designated, presumably as expert witnesses as
they had no factual involvement in the case.

(R. 193-94.)

On

April 16, 1984, defendants served an interrogatory on plaintiff
requesting information concerning the witnesses listed.
(R. 211.)

By July, 1984, plaintiff still had not responded to

the interrogatory and defendant filed another motion to
compel.

(R. 234-35.)

Eventually, plaintiff answered the interrogatory and stated
she would not call Brian Burns or Douglas Flegal.
is a chiropractor.

Brian Burns

Douglas Flegal is a podiatrist who had

never been contacted by plaintiff or her counsel.

After defen-

dant Mott's counsel noticed the deposition of Douglas Lake in
May, 1984, plaintiff's counsel advised by letter dated May 22,
1984, that Douglas Lake would not be called as an expert
witness at trial.

(R. 273.)

It later appeared that, despite

the statement in the affidavit that Dr. Lake had reviewed
Dr. Mott's records and had determined that Dr. Mott was negligent, Dr. Lake had never reviewed any of Dr. Mott's records.
(R. 274-75.)

-5-

Irving Yale was a podiatrist who practiced in Connecticut.
He passed away on April 2, 1983, over one year before plaintiff
designated him as a trial witness.

(R. 280-81.)

The sole

expert witness designated by plaintiff, who is still living and
who her counsel has not represented will not be called, is
Dr. William Fleming.
Dr. Fleming's deposition was taken May 30, 1984.

He testi-

fied that he had never seen Dr. Mott's medical records pertaining to the plaintiff and that he does not know what the standard of care applicable to a podiatrist is.
The admissible record before the court at the time of the
motion thus consisted of the undisputed affidavits of
Drs. Mott, Kimball and Beveridge.

Dr. Mott referred plaintiff

to Dr. Kimball, an orthopedist, for treatment.

Dr. Kimball

diagnosed peripheral vascular disease and an arterial occlusion, and called in Dr. Beveridge, a vascular surgeon, for surgery.

Each doctor testified that he had treated the plaintiff,

that he was familiar with the standard of care ordinarily exercised by podiatrists in the Salt Lake area in 1980, and that in
his opinion Dr. Mott had complied in all respects with that
standard.

(R. 276-77, 278-79, 282-83.)

The following facts were established in the record before
the court and were not controverted by any competent evidence:
1.
Dr. Mott is a podiatrist licensed to practice in
the State of Utah. (R. 276.)
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2.
During May, 1980, Dr. Mott treated plaintiff for
complaints of pain in her foot. (R. 277.)
3.
Dr. Mott's treatment and care of plaintiff
complied in all respects with the standard of care
ordinarily exercised by podiatrists in the Salt Lake
community during 1980. (R. 276, 279, 283.)
On October 24, 1984, Mott moved for summary judgment and
for sanctions pursuant to Rule 56(g), U.R.C.P., which provides
for sanctions against parties who file affidavits in bad
faith.

(R. 284-85.)

Summary judgment in favor of defendant

Mott was entered January 9, 1985 (R. 322-23), and was certified
final pursuant to Rule 54(b), U.R.C.P., on January 29, 1985.
(R. 337.)

The notice of appeal was filed February 21, 1985.

(R. 338.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The plaintiff in a professional malpractice case must
produce competent expert testimony establishing the standard of
care ordinarily followed by practitioners in the defendant's
field of practice and that the defendant breached that standard
of care.

Plaintiff in this case has, despite numerous oppor-

tunities in the district court, failed to produce any competent
expert testimony supporting her claim against Dr. Mott.
Of the witnesses identified by plaintiff during discovery,
Dr. Fleming is the only expert witness who is still living and
whom plaintiff has represented will be called at trial.
Dr. Fleming, however, admitted that he was not familiar with
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the standard of care ordinarily followed by podiatrists, and
thus cannot opine as to Dr. Mott's compliance with such standard.

Further, Dr. Fleming has never reviewed Mott's records

regarding plaintiff's treatment, and thus any testimony he may
have given is without foundation.
The issue in this case is not, as plaintiff argues, whether
any medical doctor can testify in a professional malpractice
case against a podiatrist.

Rather, the issue is whether

Dr. Fleming, who by his own admission does not know the applicable standard of care, can so testify.
The liability for professional malpractice is not measured
by any uniform or absolute standard.

Rather, it is predicated

on the breach by the defendant of the standard ordinarily exercised by practitioners in similar specialties in the community.

Thus, neither the fact that the training and licensing

requirements for physicians and podiatrists partially overlap
nor the fact that a physician can specialize in podiatry if he
so chooses, provides any basis for allowing Dr. Fleming to
opine as to application of a standard which he admits he does
not know.
The testimony of Dr. Lake is also insufficient to insulate
plaintiff from summary judgment.

Plaintiff does not assert in

her brief that Dr. Lake's testimony should be considered, and
the record demonstrates that Dr. Lake never reviewed Mott's
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file.

Rather, Dr. Lake gave his opinion without the benefit of

review of the file because plaintiff's counsel had told him
that his affidavit was needed immediately in order to retain
her position in the suit.

The affidavit was a sham and was

properly disregarded.
The record before the court, other than as identified
above, consisted of the affidavits of three doctors, including
Dr. Mott, each of whom had treated plaintiff, was familiar with
the applicable standard of care and opined that Dr. Mott had
complied therewith in all respects.

In the face of such evi-

dence, the district court acted properly in granting summary
judgment.

ARGUMENT
THERE WAS NO FACTUAL DISPUTE REGARDING
DR. MOTT'S COMPLIANCE WITH THE APPLICABLE
STANDARD OF CARE.
To make a prima facie case in a professional malpractice
case, the plaintiff must present competent evidence establishing:

(1) the standard of care ordinarily exercised by other

practitioners in the defendant's field of practice, (2) that
the defendant departed from the applicable standard of care,
and (3) that such departure proximately caused the injury.
Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 351 (Utah 1980); Anderson v.
Nixon, 104 Utah 262, 139 P.2d 216, 220 (1943).
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These three elements of the plaintiff's prima facie case
must be established by competent expert testimony.

Marsh v.

Pemberton, 10 Utah 2d 40, 347 P.2d 1108, 1110 (1959).

It is

not sufficient to merely show that an adverse result occurred.
A physician is not an insurer or guarantor of results and no
presumption or inference of negligence may be made from the
mere fact of an adverse result.

Marsh v. Pemberton, supra.

The rationale for requiring expert testimony is compelling.

The issues presented by medical malpractice cases gener-

ally involve medical questions and medical judgments beyond the
knowledge and experience of laymen.

Without the assistance of

expert medical testimony, the finder of fact is left to impermissibly base a verdict upon speculation and conjecture as to
what standard of care was required and whether it was met.
Anderson v. Nixon, supra.
Summary judgment is appropriate to save time and expense
for the parties and the court where the plaintiff in a medical
malpractice case is unable to produce expert testimony which
would establish a prima facie case.

In Maxfield v. Fishier,

538 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1975), the Utah Supreme Court affirmed a
dismissal of a medical malpractice case prior to trial for
failure to prosecute because of the plaintiff's inability to
proffer expert testimony supporting the claims against the
defendant doctor.
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Similarly, in Baxter v. Snow, 78 Utah 217, 2 P.2d 257
(1931), the trial court was chided for allowing a medical malpractice case to go to the jury in the absence of any expert
medical testimony supporting the plaintiff's claim.

The

Supreme Court stated the trial court should have directed a
verdict in favor of the defendant when plaintiff failed to
produce expert witnesses to establish his claim of negligence.
The court held it was inappropriate to allow plaintiff to bring
an action based upon mere conjecture, speculation or suspicion.

2 P.2d at 263.

In a similar case, the Washington State Appellate Court
affirmed the trial court's entry of summary judgment based upon
the plaintiff's failure to present any expert medical testimony
showing the defendant had failed to comply with the applicable
standard of care.

The court held:

"The plaintiff's failure to

present essential expert medical testimony or at a minimum to
demonstrate that such evidence would be available for trial,
was sufficient justification for the trial court's summary
judgment."

Swanson v. Briqham, 18 Wash. App. 647, 571 P.2d

217, 220 (1977).
In the case at bar, plaintiff has offered absolutely no
competent evidence supporting her claim against Dr. Mott.

The

only evidence in the record which plaintiff can cite as support
for her position is the deposition testimony of Dr. Fleming
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and the affidavit of Dr. Lake.

As will be shown below, that

evidence was not sufficient to stand the test of summary judgment, and the lower court's ruling should be affirmed.
A.

Dr. Fleming Is Not Qualified To Give Expert Medical
Testimony Regarding The Standard Of Care To Be
Followed By A Podiatrist.

Plaintiff argues in her brief that the testimony of
Dr. William H. Fleming, a medical doctor (M.D.) in Oklahoma
specializing in thoracic and vascular surgery (Fleming Depo.
p. 4), is sufficient to establish the negligence of Dr. Mott, a
doctor of podiatric medicine (D.P.M.).

Plaintiff argues that a

physician is qualified as a matter of law to give expert testimony against a podiatrist.

The correct issue, however, is not

whether any physician can testify against a podiatrist, but
rather is specifically whether plaintiff's expert in this case
can so testify.
It is unnecessary for the court to reach the issue argued
by the plaintiff because Dr. Fleming, who does not purport to
practice podiatry, admitted that he was unfamiliar with the
standard of care applicable to podiatrists:
Q.

So correct me if I'm wrong, but you're willing to
state that Dr. Mott violated a standard care
applicable to him without even seeing his records?

A.

If he were a physician I could certainly say
yes. I don't know what the standard of care is
[sic] expected of a podiatrist is.

(Fleming Depo. pp. 42-43).
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Fleming's admission that he does not know the standard of
care applicable to podiatrists renders any opinion he might
have given inadmissible.

In Walkenhorst v. Kesler, 92 Utah

312, 67 P.2d 654 (1937), this court held that when a patient
selects a practitioner in a particular field, he adopts and
accepts the standard of care ordinarily followed by practitioners in that field.

67 P.2d at 663. The standard of care

followed by practitioners in other specialties is immaterial.
Accordingly, Dr. Fleming's opinion regarding the standard of
care ordinarily followed by medical doctors would be immaterial
and inadmissible against this defendant.

Because Dr. Fleming

admitted that he did not know the standard of care applicable
to a podiatrist, he was not qualified to give an opinion as to
Dr. Mott's treatment.
Even if Dr. Fleming were qualified to opine on the practice
of podiatry, his testimony in this case was without the foundation required under Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
Dr. Fleming admitted in his testimony that he had not reviewed
any of Dr. Mott's records except for one bill:
Q.

Okay. Now, back to any other criticism you have
of the care and treatment given to this patient.

A.

Okay. Dr. Mott—and, again, I have never seen
any office records. I don't know what the man
saw, what he wrote down. I have never been
privied any records. This is the only thing I
have on him, is a bill that lists three, six,
seven, eight, nine, ten visits between 5/12 and
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6/18, and indicating office visit, x-rays, cast,
and some billing information.
Q.

Okay. Let me—maybe I can shortcut that then.
You've never seen Dr. Mott's records?

A.

That's correct.

(Fleming Depo. p. 41.)
In Edwards v. Didericksen, 597 P.2d 1328 (Utah 1979), this
court summarized the prerequisites to the admission of expert
testimony:
The admissibility of [expert] evidence depends in
large measure upon the foundation laid. The expertise
of the witness, his degree of familiarity with the
necessary facts, and the logical nexus between his
opinion and the facts adduced must be established.
When such a foundation is laid, Rule 56 of the Utah
Rules of Evidence makes an expert's opinion admissible, even though it embraces an ultimate issue.
597 P.2d at 1331.

In the case at bar, the necessary foundation

was not present, and the testimony of Dr. Fleming was thus
insufficient to withstand the test of summary judgment.

See

Walker v. Rocky Mountain Recreation Corp., 29 Utah 2d 274, 508
P.2d 538, 542 (1973) .
Even if Dr. Fleming had not admitted that he did not know
the standard of care applicable to podiatrists, his status as a
physician would not alone qualify him to testify against a
podiatrist.

Rather, the party seeking to introduce this testi-

mony must establish that, through experience, training or
observation, the witness has knowledge of the standard of care
commonly practiced in defendant's specialty.
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In Greene v. Thomas, 662 P.2d 491 (Colo. App. 1982), the
plaintiff attempted to qualify a dermatologist to testify as to
the standard of care for plastic surgeons.

Preliminary testi-

mony, however, established that the dermatologist had never
performed surgery such as that performed by a plastic surgeon
on the plaintiff and that his knowledge of the standard of care
for plastic surgeons was limited.
Exclusion of the dermatologist's opinion was affirmed on
appeal.

The appellate court stated that:

The plaintiff in a medical malpractice case must
prove that the defendant specialist failed to meet the
standard of care required of physicians in the same
specialty practiced by the defendant. And, to qualify
a witness as an expert on that standard of care, the
party offering the witness must establish the witness's knowledge and familiarity with the standard of
care and treatment commonly practiced by physicians
engaged in the defendant's specialty. [Citations.]
A number of jurisdictions have held that the
expert witness must have acquired, through experience
or study, more than just a casual familiarity with the
standards of care in the defendant's specialty.
Fitzmaurice v. Flynn, 167 Conn. 609, 356 A.2d 887
(1975); Gaston v. Hunter, 121 Ariz. 33, 588 P.2d 326
(1978); Ishler v. Miller, 56 Ohio St. P.2d 447, 384
N.E.2d 296 (1978); Radman v. Harold, 279 Md. 167, 367
A.2d 472 (1977).
662 P.2d at 493.

See also Carp v. Bumpus, 30 Colo. App. 144,

491 P.2d 606 (1971) (medical doctor not qualified to testify
against osteopath.)
Walkenhorst v. Kesler, 92 Utah 312, 67 P.2d 654 (1937),
cited by appellant is not to the contrary.
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In Walkenhorst, the

court allowed a medical doctor to testify against a chiropractor, but did so because it found that the chiropractor had gone
beyond the specialty of chiropractic and was practicing medicine.

67 P.2d at 666.

The medical doctor, being familiar with

the standard of care applicable to the practice of medicine in
which the defendant had engaged, was thus qualified to testify.

The case did not hold, as appellant asserts, that a

general practitioner is qualified as a matter of law to testify
as an expert witness in all fields of medicine regardless of
actual familiarity with the applicable standard of care.
Appellant's argument that the Utah statutory scheme requires the court to hold as a matter of law that all physicians
and surgeons are qualified to testify against podiatrists is
without merit.

Although licensed physicians and surgeons are

authorized under the statute to practice podiatry, Utah Code
Ann. § 58-5-12 (Supp. 1983), it does not necessarily follow
that a physician or surgeon so licensed but not specializing in
podiatry will have the requisite knowledge of the standard of
care applicable to podiatrists, who undergo different training
than medical doctors.

Podiatrists go to podiatry school, not

medical school, and earn the designation doctor of podiatric
medicine (D.P.M.) not medical doctor (M.D.).

This court in

Walkenhorst, by determining whether the chiropractor in that
case had engaged in the general practice of medicine with which
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the medical doctor would be familiar, implicitly recognized
that a medical doctor's qualification to testify against a
doctor of another specialty is not automatic.

Had appellant's

position in this case been adopted in Walkenhorst, such a
finding would have been unnecessary.
The partial overlap in the training and statutory licensing
requirements of physicians and podiatrists is simply insufficient standing alone to qualify a physician to testify as to
the standard of care applicable to podiatrists.

The liability

for professional malpractice is not measured by any absolute or
uniform standard; rather, such liability is predicated on
breach of the standard ordinarily exercised by similar practitioners in the local community.
348, 351 (Utah 1980).

Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d

The standard is an actual standard drawn

from practice, and knowledge thereof is not conferred by satisfaction of the statutory licensing requirements alone.
Mott does not contend that a medical doctor can never
testify against a podiatrist, and that issue is not before the
court.

In an appropriate case, a medical doctor could qualify

to give an opinion regarding whether a podiatrist has followed
the standard of care ordinarily followed by podiatrists in the
community.

Indeed, in this case, Drs. Kimball and Beveridge,

who testified by affidavit that Dr. Mott complied with the
applicable standard, are medical doctors, not podiatrists.
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The

crucial difference between Dr. Fleming and Drs. Kimball and
Beveridge is that Fleming admitted he was not familiar with the
applicable standard of care, whereas Kimball and Beveridge
testified that they were familiar with such standard.
Dr. Fleming is a medical doctor specializing in thoracic
and vascular surgery.
trained in podiatry.

He is not a podiatrist, and is not
Further, he admits that he does not know

the standard of care ordinarily exercised by podiatrists and
admits that he has never reviewed Dr. Mott's records regarding
the symptoms of the plaintiff or the treatment given her.
Plaintiff was given ample opportunity to produce an expert
qualified to opine as to the application of the standard of
care in this case, but was unable to do so, making the motion
for summary judgment timely and appropriate.

See Strand v.

Associated Students of the University of Utah, 561 P.2d 191,
193-94 (Utah 1977).

The district court thus acted properly in

granting Dr. Mott's motion for summary judgment.
B.

The Affidavit of Dr. Lake Was A Sham And Was Properly
Disregarded.

Other than the deposition testimony of Dr. Fleming, the
only evidence in this case ostensibly supporting plaintiff's
claim against Dr. Mott is the affidavit of Douglas Lake, M.D.
That affidavit, however, cannot be considered on the motion for
summary judgment because plaintiff has represented that
Dr. Lake will not be called as a trial witness.
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(R. 273.)

Plaintiff admits as much by not arguing from Lake's affidavit
in her brief.

Further, even if plaintiff had not represented

that Lake would not be called, the record establishes that
Dr. Lake's affidavit was a sham and was thus properly
disregarded.
In February, 1984, the district court ruled that it would
vacate the order of dismissal entered in November, 1983 only if
plaintiff filed an affidavit from an expert witness establishing a prima facie case of negligence against each defendant by
March 1, 1984.

The affidavit filed by plaintiff to ostensibly

comply with the court's order was the affidavit of Douglas
Lake, M.D.

(R. 172-74.)

The sole qualification stated in

Dr. Lake's affidavit was that he is a licensed physician with
expertise in medicolegal evaluations.

In fact, Dr. Lake does

not presently practice medicine and when he did practice, his
specialty was plastic surgery.

(R. 183.)

More misleading, however, are the statements in his affidavit that his conclusions were reached after careful review and
that he had "examined the records of contact by each of the
defendants and based thereon believets] that each and all of
the named defendants failed to provide the appropriate care at
the appropriate time, and that such failure represents a
departure from the accepted standards of medical practice."
(R. 173.)

In fact, Douglas Lake had never reviewed or even
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seen the records of Dr. Mott pertaining to the plaintiff.

The

records sent by Dr. Lake to Dr. Fleming did not include
Dr. Mott's records, except for one bill.

It became apparent

and plaintiff's counsel admitted at the deposition of
Dr. Fleming on May 30, 1984 that Dr. Lake had never received
copies of Dr. Mott's medical records pertaining to plaintiff.
(Fleming depo. pp. 21, 41.)
The true nature of Dr. Lake's affidavit is disclosed in a
letter dated February 24, 1984 to Douglas Lake, M.D. from the
office of plaintiff's counsel.

(R. 274-75.)

The letter states:

Dear Dr. Lake:
You will recall our recent telephone conversations
concerning the captioned case. You remarked that you
could be "Horatio" in such instances wherein we need
an immediate affidavit to retain our position in the
lawsuit.
In an effort to make your review less demanding, we
have drafted an affidavit which we believe will
satisfy our needs. . . .

I shall be available to discuss any part of this on
the telephone. We must have an affidavit in our hands
by 10:00 AM the morning of March 1, 1984 (Thursday)
and hope you can express the affidavit to us Tuesday
night.
Very truly yours,
ANTHONY M. THURBER
Bryant E. Hansen, Legal Assistant
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Defendant had been requesting identification of plaintiff's
expert witnesses through interrogatories and motions to compel,
and the obvious intent of the court's February, 1984, order was
to require plaintiff to file an affidavit establishing a prima
facie case of negligence against each defendant by an expert
witness who would be called at trial.

It is clear that plain-

tiff never intended to call Dr. Lake as an expert witness.
Rather, his affidavit was filed because plaintiff needed an
immediate affidavit to retain her position in the lawsuit.
More importantly, however, the affidavit misrepresents the
foundation for Dr. Lake's opinion because it is clear that he
never reviewed the records of Dr. Mott.

For these reasons, the

affidavit of Douglas Lake cannot insulate plaintiff from
summary judgment.
C.

The Competent Evidence Establishes Dr. Mott's Compliance With The Applicable Standard Of Care As A Matter
Of Law.

The affidavits of Drs. Kimball and Beveridge, the orthopedist and the vascular surgeon who treated the plaintiff for
an arterial occlusion following her treatment by Dr. Mott, and
Dr. Mott's own affidavit are uncontroverted and establish that
he complied in all respects with the standard of care ordinarily followed by podiatrists in the Salt Lake community during
1980.

The district court's grant of summary judgment was

therefore proper and should be affirmed.
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Plaintiff half-heartedly asserts in her brief that
"Dr. Mott himself admitted that he should have diagnosed plaintiff's peripheral vascular disease but inexplicably failed to
do so."

(Brief of Appellant, p. 7.)

Examination of the pas-

sage in plaintiff's deposition which plaintiff cites as support
for the alleged admission reveals the true nature of the
alleged admission:
A.

Okay. I was having my therapy. I was in the
tub, and Robert Blair had stepped out of the
room. Dr. Mott came in. He asked me how I was
doing, and I told him I wasn't doing too good.
And he said, "Well, I'm sorry about this. I'm
sorry I missed it." (Martin Depo. pp. 87-88.)

Plainly, the alleged statement is not an admission that
Dr. Mott failed to comply with the applicable standard of
care.

In order to establish a prima facie case to withstand

the test of summary judgment, plaintiff was required to show by
competent expert testimony that Dr. Mott violated the local
standard of practice for podiatrists.
"admission" does neither.

Dr. Mott's alleged

A jury could not have based a

verdict on such a statement without competent expert testimony
Baxter v. Snow, 78 Utah 217, 2 P.2d 257 (1931).

The statement

is more akin to a lawyer's apology to his client for losing a
case; the apology does not establish that the lawyer committed
professional malpractice.

If such a statement alone were

sufficient to withstand the test of summary judgment and get
the case to the jury, the summary judgment procedure would be
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eviscerated.

The district court acted properly in granting the

motion for summary judgment, and its action should be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
The treatment complained of in this case occurred over four
years ago.

The action has been pending for over three years

and in spite of repeated extensions of deadlines, the plaintiff
has been unable to proffer any expert testimony establishing
the standard of care applicable to podiatrists or that Dr. Mott
violated the applicable standard of care.

Therefore, the trial

court's grant of defendant Mott*s motion for summary judgment
should be affirmed.
DATED this

/r

day of July, 1985.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

By
Rodney R. IParker
Attorneys for Respondent Mott
SCM1211G

-23-
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I certify that I caused four true and correct copies of the
foregoing Brief of Respondent to be served by first class mail
upon the following on July 15, 1985:
Anthony M. Thurber
Suite 735 Judge Building
8 East Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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